In this paper an attempt is made to provide an analysis of the meaning of the term function and related terms as they are used by R. K. Merton in the first chapter of his book Social Theory and Social Structure. Several problems are suggested which must be solved if statements about functions are to be considered scientifically adequate. Secondly the term functionalism is defined and several of Merton's functionalist explanations of social phenomena are stated and criticized.

If the principle of equal pay for work of equal value is valid, then the practice of paying workers in third-world countries at a lower rate than workers doing the same jobs in industrialized nations is unjust. Recently Henry Shue argued that the principle is not valid. In this paper I criticize Shue's arguments and offer additional arguments in support of his conclusion.

Mathematical objects, according to intuitionists, exist only in the mind of the mathematician. Such objects are, in reality, structures which are created by the mathematician. Creation of such structures is limited by the capability of the mind to generate sequences of objects. Knowledge of mathematical objects or structures is possible through the mind’s capability to survey or inspect the structures that it has created. The platonist, contrary to the intuitionist, maintains that mathematical objects have an existence which is not causally (...) dependent on the mind of the mathematician. Such objects, he believes, are not created through the mind’s activity. Both platonists and intuitionists agree that there are mathematical objects; they disagree with respect to the causal origin of such objects. (shrink)

In a recent paper, the mathematician Harold Edwards claimed that Euler’s alleged proof, that Fermat’s last theorem is true for the case n = 3, is flawed. Fermat’s last theorem is the conjecture that there are no positive integers x, y, z, or n, such that n is greater than two and such that xn + yn = zn. In this paper we shall first briefly explain the specific flaw to which Edwards called attention. After that we briefly explain the (...) nature of mathematical proofs and with reference to such proofs explain the nature of gaps in proofs. Then we critically discuss an alternative view concerning the nature of proofs in mathematics and discuss the alternative view critically. Specifically we argue that advocates of this alternative view, which we call mathematical postulationism, have not provided a satisfactory account of the nature of gaps in proofs. The unsatisfactoriness of postulationist accounts of gaps in proofs is revealed through reflection concerning appropriate repairs to proofs with gaps. (shrink)

Parfit’s well known book, Reasons and Persons, argues, among other things, that ‘what matters’ in regard to ‘survival’ is not personal identity but something he calls ‘relation R.’ On this basis, plus other considerations, he rejects the ‘Self-interest’ theory as to what should be our aim in life. Here I show, or try to show, that his over-all argument is seriously defective. In particular, he fails to prove that personal identity is not what matters for survival.

I would like to get this published somewhere; but who would publish it?

It seems clear that second order fuzziness (indeterminacy) is possible. There can be borderline cases of borderline cases. But how about third order cases? Is there no end of degrees of borderlinehood? I offer a somewhat strange little 'language game' that seems to suggest that the ascension ends with second order cases. (The 'game' is intended to be somewhat like a simplified version of color perception.).

Nussbaum seems to have had a spell during which she made villains heroes (and sometimes visa versa). Thus she has argued, in effect, that Steerforth is the hero of David Copperfield, and Heathcliff the most admirable character in Wuthering Heights. Here I discuss her more or less explicit claim that Alcibiades is the hero, (and Socrates the villain) in Plato’s Symposium. -/- .

I have been told that for some twenty minutes after reading this paper Kripke believed I had shown that proper names could be non-rigid designators. (Then, apparently, he found a crucial error in the set-up.) I take great pride in this (alleged) fact.

In 1974 Putnam was a ‘realist’ in regard to the physical world. By 1981 he had become a 'non-realist' in this regard. (I don’t know where he stands today.) In this paper I argue that his realism was more plausible than his non-realism. The physical world is what it is independently of any rational being’s interpretation of it.

In Analysis, Vol. 45, June 1984, George Rea published a paper attacking my claim that there could be ‘indeterminate minds'. This paper is a reply to his attack. I claim, again, that such ‘minds’ are possible – entities such that it is indeterminate whether or not these entities are people with minds. -/- .

This is a boiled down version of my doctoral dissertation. Ryle wouldn’t publish it, claiming that it is like ‘a well sharpened pencil that no one will ever use.’ I guess he turned out to be right. Nevertheless I think it was, and is, a good paper.

This was an attempt to show what is wrong with Anselm’s ‘Ontological Argument’ for the existence of God. My present view is that Peter Millican has given us a similar, but much better line of attack in his “The One Fatal Flaw….” Paper.

We explored the consequences for learning through interaction with an educational microworld called Electric Field Hockey (EFH). Like many microworlds, EFH is intended to help students develop a qualitative understanding of the target domain, in this case, the physics of electrical interactions. Through the development and use of a computer model that learns to play EFH, we analyzed the knowledge the model acquired as it applied the game‐oriented strategies we observed physics students using. Through learning‐by‐doing on the standard sequence of (...) tasks, the model substantially improved its EFH playing ability; however, it did so without acquiring any new qualitative physics knowledge. This surprising result led to an experiment that compared students' use of EFH with standard‐goal tasks against two alternative instructional conditions, specific‐path and no‐goal, each justified from a different learning theory. Students in the standard‐goal condition learned less qualitative physics than did those in the two alternative conditions, which was consistent with the model. The implication for instructional practice is that careful selection and analysis of the tasks that frame microworld use is essential if these programs are to lead to the learning outcomes imagined for them. Theoretically, these results suggest a new interpretation for numerous empirical findings on the effectiveness of no‐goal instructional tasks. The standing “reduced cognitive load” interpretation is contradicted by the success of the specific‐path condition, and we offer an alternative knowledge‐dependent interpretation. (shrink)

Over the last half century, a multijurisdictional, multiscale system of governance has emerged to address concerns associated with toxic chemicals that have the capacity to bioaccumulate in organisms and biomagnify in food chains, leading to fish consumption advisories. Components of this system of governance include international conventions (such as the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants and the Minamata Convention on Mercury), laws enacted by nation states and their subjurisdictions, and efforts to adaptively manage regional ecosystems (such as the U.S.–Canadian (...) Great Lakes). Given that many of these compounds – including mercury, industrial chemicals such as polychlorinated biphenyls, and pesticides such as toxaphene – circulate throughout the globe through cycles of deposition and reemission, regional efforts to eliminate the need for fish consumption advisories cannot be successful without efforts to reduce emissions everywhere in the world. This paper argues that the scientific community, by monitoring the concentrations of these compounds in the atmosphere and by modeling their fate and transport, play an important role in connecting the various jurisdictional scales of governance. In addition, the monitoring networks that this community of scientists has established can be visualized as a technology of governance essential in an era in which societies have the capacity to produce and release such chemicals on an industrial scale. (shrink)